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INTRODUCTION
Marketing has long been recognized as a vital element
for success in the corporate world (Copeland, 1923).

One

notable exception to this has been the health care industry.
It was not until the late 1970s that marketing finally
entered the health care realm (Cooper, 1979).

The majority

of initial advertising and promotional efforts focused on
"image" as opposed to "product" (Super, 1986).
While the goals of both image and product marketing are
to increase sales of goods and services, their methods are
different.

Image or "institutional" advertising is used to

create a favorable image of the corporation in the public's
mind and is especially useful if this public has any preexisting negative perceptions.

Product advertising, on the

other hand, promotes the actual goods and/or services of the
corporation (Sachs, 1983).
There are two main reasons the health care industry
first chose to employ image over product promotion.

First,

the medical industry was highly skeptical about any form of
marketing, particularly advertising, and wanted to approach
it in a low key style.

They shied away from the hard sell

tactics of product advertising and chose instead to promote
a new image (Super, 1986).
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Secondly, there was a very real need for a new image.
Since the 1960s, the health care industry had been
experiencing an increasingly severe crisis of confidence on
the part of the general public (Cooper, 1979).

Therefore,

the majority of hospitals decided that what they needed to
promote was a more positive, humane representation of their
institutions (Brown, 1973).

In addition, they did not view

their services as "products," and therefore felt no need to
sell them as such (Starr, 1982).
Based on these assumptions, the first several years of
health care marketing were predominantly image oriented.
Gradually a few "products" were eased into the marketing
strategy.

Leading the way were the health care services

involving women, most notably childbirth facilities.

Again

the industry was responding to a crisis, in which women
increasingly were turning to alternative methods of childbirth, such as mid-wifery, to escape the so-called
"coldness" or "impersonal" image of the maternity wards
(Starr, 1982).
Hospitals were slow to employ marketing research as
well (Mages, 1985).

Eventually they did begin hiring

outside research companies in order to test the
effectiveness of their advertisements. The results were
surprising:

the ads were not working (Powills, 1986d).

According to one recent study conducted by an Omaha,
Nebraska-based firm, Professional Research Consultants, Inc.
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and Hospitals, an industry magazine, more than half of
health care consumers did not recall seeing the hospitals'
advertisements.

Hospitals' marketing writer, Suzanne

Powills (1986d, p. 66), attributes this in part to "the fact
that many hospitals continue to advertise image rather than
specific services."
The president of Professional Research Consultants,
Inc. had this comment:

"Consumers want to know why they

should utilize one hospital's services over another, and an
advertisement saying 'We care' does not give consumers
reason enough to choose a particular hospital." (Powills,
1986d, p. 66).
The researchers involved in this survey reached this
conclusion when they realized that the ads that were
remembered most frequently by nearly 44% of surveyed
consumers contained information about specific services,
such as emergency department care and obstetrics and
birthing centers.

Further it also showed that 86.1%

of this group could recall the name of the hospital
sponsoring the ad (Powills, 1986d).
The view that image marketing, although highly utilized
by the health care industry, may be the most ineffective
strategy for them, is new.

The few articles expressing

similar views appeared in health care trade journals and
were all published within the last year.

These articles

appear to be based almost solely on individuals' intuitive
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judgments.

And in some cases their arguments are derived

from privately commissioned surveys which appear selfserving and are therefore academically suspect.
It will be the intent of this study to test with
empirical measurement the validity of the hypothesis that
hospital product marketing is more effective than image
marketing in terms of consumer recall and usage.

LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of the United States' health care industry
over the past few decades aids in the clarification of the
development of conflicting marketing strategies.

Not only

does this reveal how the health care industry differs from
other industries in terms of structure, but also in terms of
public perception and, therefore, marketing techniques.
The health care consumers of the 1940s and 1950s were
largely seen as being patient, unquestioning receivers of
relatively scarce products and services.

In the 1960s,

economic prosperity swept the country and as a consequence
yielded radical changes in all areas of consumerism.
Consumers moved from passive to active, and began
scrutinizing all industries, including the previously
exempted health care industry (Cooper, 1979).
One criticism was that hospitals, while often called
"community hospitals," had long ago stopped being responsive
to the community (Constantine & Cassidy, 1969).
According to Brown (1973, p. 11), " ... there is evidence
to support the criticism that the hospital and the medical
care system have not looked and listened outside its own
walls."
Brown further asserts that the health care industry's
perspective was introverted, having been so focused on
5
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technological advances that it overlooked the community's
health concerns.
During the 1960s, hospitals were focused on the
development of both human and technological resources, to
keep up with rapid scientific advances in the field.

Vast

research programs were implemented and tremendous emphasis
was placed on improved education and training for medical
personnel (Fuchs, 1968).
According to Brown (1973, p. 12), "The hospital had
developed into a highly sophisticated system, but had lost
sight of the individuals it was supposed to serve.

From the

eyes of the community the technological achievements were
overshadowed by the view that the hospital system was only
accountable to itself."
Another major contributing factor to this alienation of
hospital and community was the increasing intervention of
third party health care financing agencies--both voluntary
and governmental (Berry and Daugherty, 1968).

This, in

effect, was a relinquishing of the patients' economic proxy,
and thus the consumers' voice, in many matters.

On an even

larger scale, the local community had fallen victim to the
same situation, since state and national level governments
usually were footing the bills.

Therefore, the medical care

system responded to financing agencies and developed those
services and programs that corresponded with third party
reimbursement policies (Inglehart, 1976).
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These reimbursement practices led to the most
significant rift between the health care industry and its
public--the issue of costs (Feldstein, 1971).

Third party

institutions insulated patients and providers from the true
cost of treatment decisions, reducing the incentive to
analyze costs versus benefits.

From 1960 to 1975, the share

of health care expenditures paid by third parties increased
from 45% to 67%.

Most private plans, as well as Medicare

and Medicaid, paid on a fee-for-service basis.

In order for

the hospital and doctor to increase their income, they had
to increase their volume of services provided.

Thus, third-

party fee-for-service payment became the central mechanism
behind medical inflation (Macstravic, 1977).
Since hospitals were reimbursed based on their costs
for services or products, it meant that any institution
reducing its costs would also reduce its income.

This

system encouraged hospitals to solve financial problems by
maximizing costs.

Therefore, according to Starr (1982, p.

385), what became a solution for the industry became a
problem for the society it was serving.
For doctors, these reimbursement plans meant an
increased incentive not only to raise their fees, but to
hospitalize patients instead of treating them in their
offices.
Medicare and most private insurance companies paid
doctors according to "customary" fees, assuming them to be
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the prevailing fees in the area, and, therefore, reasonable.
Fees began to soar, particularly as more new doctors entered
practice.

With no established schedule of fees, they

discovered that if they billed at unprecendented levels,
they were paid.

Older colleagues soon recognized this and

raised their fees as well.

What was "customary" spiraled

higher than ever before (Starr, 1982).
Another important policy that affected both physicians
and their patients was that third party reimbursement
provided even higher compensations for services performed in
a hospital instead of in an office, even if the procedures
were identical.

This system encouraged the overuse of

hospitalization, tests and surgery, according to Starr
(1982, p. 386).
In the mid 1970s physicians earned 50% to 60% more per
hour for hospital labor time than for office labor time.
Therefore, even as technology made some procedures easier to
perform, the prices for these services continued upward.
This also led to a serious deficiency in several areas of
medical services, especially ambulatory, preventative and
basic family health care.

Specializing became more popular

because it was so financially beneficial.

Patients could no

longer expect one physician to treat them for everything
from diagnostic to post-operative care.

Surgeons were

relieved of many duties by technicians and assistants
(Starr, 1982).
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As the medical bills escalated, so did the crisis of
confidence by consumers.

In 1965, with the passing of

Medicare and Medicaid legislation, the goverment was
spending $42 billion for health care.

This number jumped to

$133 billion by 1975, and by 1982 the figure had soared to
$322 billion. (Rosenstein, 1984/1985).
Until the 1970s, insurance companies had been able to
offset rising costs by raising premiums.

However, with the

growth of government spending, insurance companies became
concerned that, in order to offset some of these costs, the
government might shift some charges to the consumer, and
thus, in turn, to the insurance company.

Employers,

meanwhile, struggled to meet continuing increases in group
insurance costs.

By the 1970s, rampant costs caused these

three agencies--employers, the insurance companies and the
government--to unite against the health care providers in a
move for state regulation of hospital charges (Starr, 1982).
At the same time the issue of human rights was at the
forefront of public interest.

In the 1960s, this was

primarily focused on the civil rights of Black Americans.
In the 1970s attention moved to other groups, such as women,
children, other ethnic groups, homosexuals and students.
Included in this concern were patients and their rights,
especially for the mentally ill, retarded and handicapped.
A trend of deinstitutionalization phased out many long-term
health care facilities.

There developed a strong desire to
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"demedicalize" certain critical life events, such as birth
and death.

A public rejection of hospital care was

expressed in the rise of hospices and home births (Starr,
1982).
"Health care moved into an issue of rights and no
longer privilege," according to Starr (1982). "No other idea
so captures the spirit of the time."
Further health care rights issues were pressed: (a) the
right to informed consent, (b) the right to refuse
treatment, (c) the right to see one's own medical records,
and (d), the right to participate in therapeutic decisions
(Winston, 1984).

This recognition of rights obligated

doctors and hospitals to share more information and
authority with their patients.
a right to health care.

The laws began to recognize

Courts ruled that doctors had a

duty to present all material facts to their patients,
including risks of treatment and medical procedures.

Any

patient who had been denied such information and suffered an
injury could sue for malpractice.

In 1972, the trustees of

the American Hospital Association, following the lead of
some local hospitals and health care centers, adopted a
Patients' Bill of Rights, which included rights to informed
consent and "considerate and respectful care" (Starr, 1982).
These radical changes led to patients becoming more
interested in being educated about the nature of their
health problems, their treatment and preventative measures.
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They became more concerned about health care costs,
convenience and accessibility, creating a demand for a
return to ambulatory care (Rosenstein, 1984/1985).
They also began to practice many simplier medical
precautionary services in their own homes, such as taking
their own blood pressure (Jarrett, Swanson & Swanson, 1985).
But, according to Starr (1982, p. 389), the greatest
distrust of physician domination came on the part of women.
The women's movement significantly affected the health care
industry in a variety of ways.

First, there was a

significant increase in the number of women entering medical
schools, going from 9% in 1970 to over 25% by 1980 (Galin,
1985).
Women began to assert themselves in health care in
other ways.

In 1973, the Supreme Court legalized abortions,

and an underground industry "surfaced" with the support of
women's groups.

This led to a major change in gynecological

care and services, encouraging more "self-care" and a return
to midwifery (Starr, 1982).
Feminists argued that medical care needed to be
demystified and women's lives demedicalized, as childbirth
was not a disease and that normal deliveries did not require
hospitalization and the supervision of an obstetrician
(Ruzek, 1978).
This notion generated one of the biggest conflicts
between women's health care consumers and the medical
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profession (Starr, 1982).

And it was this battle that

eventually lead toward the first marketing of a health care
product--maternity care.

By the late 1970s, hospitals had

begun promoting alternative methods of childbirth, such as
the Lamaze method.

Conditions, while still antiseptic and

supervised, became more personalized, with husbands being
allowed to participate in births.

Rooms were designed to

look "like home," lights were lowered, drugs avoided.
Visiting hours were extended and babies were allowed to stay
with the mothers longer.

Hospitals even began to promote

packages--citing prices for the entire stay, and even
throwing in gourmet meals and celebratory bottles · of
champagne.

The first promotional items also appeared here,

with newborns receiving personalized bibs, rattles and
certificates bearing the hospital's name (Starr, 1982).
Obstetrics became one of the first areas of medicinal
service to be marketed as a product by the hospitals.

They

put together package rates and used billboards, radio,
television, and direct mail promotion (Starr, 1982).
The women's movement also had a dramatic impact in
advocating holistic medicine.

This broad cultural and

political movement sought a humane alternative to the
impersonal, symptom-treating medicine of the contemporary
hospital.

It challenged the necessity of many surgical

procedures, and the values of elitist medical practice,
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dominated by sophisticated technology and techniques (Starr,
1982).
The growing acceptance of a right to medical care and
the mobilization of various advocacy groups led to the
realization that equal access to medical care required that
cost control be built into the health care delivery system.
According to Starr (1982, p. 390), "If health care was a
right, then structural reform was a necessity."
American medicine in the 1970s was caught in a
political vice between the concern of government and
business about high costs and the demand of protest
movements for equality and participation in medical care.
The health care industry was in a crisis and the finger was
pointed at the medical profession (Starr, 1982).
On February 5, 1970, HEW officals met with Paul M.
Ellwood, Jr., a Minneapolis physician who directed the
American Rehabilitation Foundation.
issue of "structural incentives."

Ellwood addressed the
In rehabilitation, as in

other fields, fee-for-service payment penalized medical
institutions that returned patients to health.

The

financing system, Ellwood argued, ought to reward health
maintenance.

Prepayment for comprehensive care could

achieve that end.

Ellwood introduced an idea that would

change the structure of American medicine permanently--the
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) (Starr, 1982, p.395).
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The economic rationale behind this and other prepaid
health plans was to provide the organization and its
physicians with a financial incentive to minimize the cost
of medical care to enrollees.

This incentive was the

"margin," the difference between the capitation payment and
the actual costs of providing medical services.

The margin

represented profit for the HMO (Feldstein, 1979).
This new scheme bfOught competition to the health care
industry.

There was a whole new emphasis on supporting

"wellness" by the insurers, employers, providers, citizens
and especially the government (Boyd, 1984/1985).

This idea

brought financial incentive for ambulatory and outpatient
care.

When HMOs did need to refer to a hospital, they were

making their selection based on obtaining the necessary
quality care at the lowest available cost (Starr, 1982).
Since the least costly avenue was the best, outpatient
surgery increased, and hospital stays for convalescence
after major surgery decreased.

There was also a whole new

incentive for preventative health care and education
(Venkatesan, 1978).

HMOs benefited most by keeping their

patients healthy, and thus their costs at a minimum.

This

also meant reducing the costs of prescriptions, as the HMOs
would be the patients' main source of drug information,
along with a preference for generic drugs at reduced prices
(Falkson, 1980).
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The White House gave its approval for HMOs in March
1970.

By the late 1970s President Nixon viewed HMOs as the

answer to what he termed "a massive crisis in health care."
The administration's goal was to help create enough HMOs by
the end of the decade to have them available to 90% of the
population (Starr, 1982, p. 396).
I

Further, Nixon called for a limit on doctors' fees to
annual increases of 2.5% and on hospital charges to increase
six% (Starr, 1982).
About this time, divergent attitudes appeared among
medical professionals.

The American Medical Association

membership fell to 50% of all physicians in 1972, as young
doctors refused to join.

A new competing organization, the

Medical Committee for Human Rights was formed and soon
claimed 7,000 members.

The AMA was forced to shift to a

more liberal posture and publicly called for concern for the
poor and a shift to family practice.

In 1973, the AMA

supported neighborhood health centers where doctors could be
paid by fee-for-service, salary or capitation as they chose.
This new advocacy was an effort to forestall the
administration from totally restructuring the health care
system.

The desperate hope was that if physicians took it

upon themselves to provide 24-hour, seven-day-a-week health
care in the population centers, then the government would
back off (Starr, 1982).
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But the government continued passing regulatory
legislation, the biggest impact coming with the National
Health Planning and Resource Development Act.

This was the

foundation of a new planning system, with 200 health systems
agencies (HSAs) to be run by boards with consumer majorities
representative of their areas.

They were to draw up three-

year plans, review proposals for projects and send
recommendations to the states on certificates of need and to
Washington on proposed uses of certain federal funds.

All

states were required to pass "certificate of need"
legislation and to establish state health planning and
development agencies and health coordinating councils.
According to Starr (1982, p. 399), this law seemed to be a
decisive rejection of the view that the market could correct
itself and that the doctors and hospitals had the last word
on how medical care ought to be organized.

Certificate of

need legislation was a vast departure from the past.

Once

the focus was on expansion of hospitals; now it was on
containment (Rosenfeld & Rosenfeld, 1975).

President Nixon

was also very strongly in favor of national health
insurance, and it is believed that if Watergate had not
taken Nixon out of office, he would have succeeded in his
plan to have it implemented by 1974 (Starr, 1982).
In 1974-1975, a severe economic recession, accompanied
by soaring inflation, stopped many medical and social reform
programs.

In August 1974, the controls on price increases
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for medical services were lifted.

So while the medical

profession had maintained only a 4.9% inrease in prices from
1971-1974, the removal of the controls let the inflation
rate hit an annual figure of 12.1%.

This stopped the

movement for national health insurance since many believed
it would bankrupt the country.

And indeed, by 1977,

Medicare and Medicaid outlays had doubled (Starr, 1982).
Meanwhile, HMOs were developing more slowly than had
been anticipated, due to lack of capital and of trained
professional management.

They finally began picking up

momentum in 1976, and by 1979, there were 217 HMOs, far
fewer than the 1700 the Nixon administration originally
foresaw.

HMO enrollment in 1979 was 7.9 million, twice as

many as in 1970.

By June 30, 1985, enrollment had increased

to 18.9 million (Higgins, 1986c).
Although they were slow to start, the HMOs had a strong
impact on hospitals' income.

Between 1986 and 1983,

research by the American Medical Association revealed that
consumers had saved an estimated $12 billion through the use
of HMOs as opposed to traditional methods of health and
hospital care ("New 'realities' challenge," 1986).
According to another survey, by 1985 hospital occupancy hit
the lowest point in two decades, 66% (Spragins, 1985).
Competition in the medical profession then appeared in
yet another way--the doctor surplus. In the early 1960s
there had been a physician shortage, so the government took
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several steps to help increase the numbers.

Between 1965

and 1980, federal aid succeeded in increasing the number of
medical schools from 88 to 126 and raising the number of
graduates from 7,409 to 15,135.

The federal government even

relaxed immigration policies to encourage foreign medical
graduates into this country.

But by 1976, these policies

had to be reversed to reduce this influx.

The numbers of

doctors in the United States had grown from 377,000 in 1975
to 450,000 in 1980.

Projections estimate that figure will

rise to 600,000 by the end of this decade (Rosenstein,
1984/1985).
This rapid increase in physicians is coinciding with a
decrease in population growth.

For every 100,000 citizens

in 1960, there were 148 doctors; 177 in 1975, and 202 in
In 1990 it is expected to jump to 245 (Ellwood &

1980.

Ellwein, 1981).
While competition was forcing doctors to seek
alternatives such as group instead of single practice and a
return to outpatient services, the same

t~ing

was happening

to the hospital (Fuchs, 1981).
Between the rising costs and decreasing client base,
consolidation became a way to survive.

The industry was

becoming dominated by huge health care conglomerates (Brown,
1985).

This unification also helped offset some of the

expenses of marketing, particularly advertising (''Multi
marketers supported,'' 1985).

In 1983 it was estimated that
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health care marketers spent $200 million.

By the end of

1986, that figure has been projected to top $1 billion
(Gray, 1986).
While consolidation of this type is normal in other
industries, this was unheard of in hospitals (diPaolo,
1981).

In 1961 there were only five consolidations of

hospitals in the United States, in the early 1970s the
number had grown to about 50 a year (Johnson, 1981).

In

1980 a survey of multi-hospital systems found that 176 owned
or managed 301,894 beds.

In 1983, 40% of the hospitals

belonged to some type of multi-hospital system (Rosenstein,
1984/1985).

This system is expected to encompass 60% by

1990 and 80% by 1995 (Johnson, 1981).
All this led to the formation of several major types of
health care providers:

(1) the academic medical "empire,"

with its extended network of affiliation agreements; (2) the
regional, non-profit multi-hospital system; (3) the
national, for-profit hospital chains; (4) HMOs, both
independent and chains; and (5) the diversified health care
conglomerate with different lines of businesses in health
care, but not offering comprehensive services to a defined
population as in HMOs (Starr, 1982).
Another organization which has recently developed and
is expected to exceed HMOs in number, is the Preferred
Provider Organization (PPO).

This program offers discounts

of about 15% to 25% to consumers for using certain
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contracted providers.

This is beneficial to hospitals and

physicians in that it increases volume, and beneficial to
the employer and consumer in terms of savings.

It is also

less restrictive than the HMO in terms of choice of
physician (Rosenstein, 1984/1985).
In addition, alternative ambulatory care systems, such
as urgent care centers and freestanding emergency centers
began appearing (Eisenberg, 1980).

Their fees typically

falling 33% less than the hospital emergency room (Burns &
Ferber, 1981).

This also led to the establishment of

outpatient surgery centers, causing many hospital emergency
rooms to reduce their fees up to 60% in an effort to compete
(Siegel, 1981).

In 1978 there were only 80 emergency care

centers in operation.

By 1984, the number jumped to 2,300,

69% of which are owned by chains.

Commerce International

Inc., a Washington, D.C. research firm, projects 5,500
centers by 1990 (Rosenstein, 1985/1986).

These ambulatory

care centers were also employing strong advertising
campaigns (Powills, 1986a).

This new competition forced

hospitals into this type of decentralized services.

They

began to establish their own centers in conjunction with
their physicians (Goldstone, 1986).
All of these corporate health care forms are now
engaged in both economic and political competition, forcing
them to turn to marketing as their primary weapon in this
arena (Goldsmith, 1981).
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The Reagan administration encouraged competition hoping
that free market forces would accomplish what regulation had
not, namely, to reduce the runaway escalation of health care
costs (Magers, 1985/1986).
In the early 1980s a reimbursement plan based on
diagnostic related groups (DRG) was established.

This meant

hospitals were paid based on costs established as "typical"
for treating people with similar illnesses.

If the hospital

exceeded this amount, they had to pay for it themselves.
This, too, provided incentive for cost reduction ("Coming:
Competition," 1984).
Competition, according to Feldstein (1979, p. 288),
along with the elimination of cost-based reimbursement, put
the csm_sumer __in__'!__-~t:r9nger__po.s-i tion.
Hospitals can no longer rely on the shrinking number of
acute care inpatient clients, and they therefore are having
to diversify and market their services.

Expansion into the

ambulatory care market is one of the most important steps to
increasing revenues and patient volume (Winston, 1984/1985).
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
this need for marketing, by allowing the health care
industry to advertise.

It was a decision that met with

mixed reaction (Pinto, 1984).
A 1985 study by Pradeep Korgaonkar showed that despite
a negative attitude toward the marketing profession,
physicians nonetheless expected marketing to play an
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important role in the practice of medicine.

Ninety percent

of those physicians surveyed, however, defined marketing as
advertising.

Physicians were most opposed to advertising

because they felt that consumers would be misled and induced
to purchase unnecessary services.

They also felt the prices

of these services would have to be increased because of the
costs of advertising (Marshall, 1977).
Mindful of the concern of misleading consumers,
hospitals and physicians both chose to use advertising
strategies focused exclusively on image, not product.
(Persinos, 1986).
Unlike physicians, consumers have been reported as
being receptive to hospital advertising.

One survey

reported that 66% of consumers felt hospitals should
advertise.

Magers (1985/1986) duplicated this study and

found similar results.
According to another study in 1986 by Modern
Healthcare, half of all consumers were aware of recent
health care advertisements (Jensen, 1986).
Hospital advertising does seem to improve community
awareness of the hospital, but it had not been proven to
increase usage.

In 1986, at the AMA's symposium on health

services marketing, Francoise Simon-Miller, a researcher
with a private firm, reported that advertisements were not a
significant factor in the supplier-selection process,
although they did enhance awareness.

Further, she
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recommended that hospitals focus on product, since "less
than half of the consumers want image advertising" ("New
'realities' challenge," 1986, p. 8).
Hospital marketing has been additionally complicated by
the diversity of its consumer base (Hicks, 1986).

Marketing

must not only target patients, but staff, visitors, medical
professionals and the community as well (Ruga, 1984).
For years, hospitals only promoted themselves to
physicians, in order to have them affiliated with their
hospital, and thereby bringing patients with them.

A 1986

study in Denver showed, however, that 34.3% of consumers
were now deciding either solely or in conjunction with their
spouses, which hospital they would utilize.

In addition,

15.1% said they would take into consideration a physician's
recommendation, therefore making a total of 49.4% of
consumers deciding for themselves which hospital to use
(Stier, 1984).

Other studies across the nation have

reinforced these findings, including one in Chicago in which
43% of consumers decided independently or participated in
the decision.

A study in Omaha showed 61% selecting their

own hospital (Mistarz, Powills, Riffer & Shannon, 1984).
"While it is still necessary to advertise and market to
physicians, overall they are carrying less clout," according
to Paul H. Keckley, president, Keckley Group for market
research (Higgins, 1986b, p. 1)

"Signs of the physicians'

eroding influence are everywhere."
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Hospitals, therefore, are realizing the need to market
not just to doctors, but to the consumer public as well
(Bauer, 1986).

According to Stier (1986, p. 19), such

considerations should include the development of a "product
line," for example, cardiac care.

"They need to look at

other things, too, such as improved accessibility, location
convenience, signage, and convenient hours," Stier added.
"They should also compile product packages with prices that
offer such luxuries previously only associated with hotel
stays."
In 1980, this need led the American Medical Association
to form a committee to organize annual symposiums on health
services marketing ("Health care marketing:

ethics," 1985).

In 1985 this committee became the Academy for Health
Services Marketing, a wholly owned and independently funded
subsidiary (Reiling, 1985).
"Almost overnight, marketing has become recognized as a
vital management function in the health care field," said
the American Medical Association president, Stephen W. Brown
(1973, p. 23).

The academy now serves about 2,000 of an

estimated 10,000 health care marketing professionals.

Last

year, the AMA's health services membership increased 72%
("Book contains papers," 1985).
Even though health care advertising is one of the
fastest growing areas in advertising, hospitals are still
approaching it somewhat haphazardly, according to Les J.
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Hauser, vice president, corporate planning and marketing, at
the DePaul Health Center, St. Louis.

Hauser further states

that given the American Hospital Association's prediction
that 20% of the United States' hospitals could be closed by
1990, it is imperative for hospital administrators to
educate themselves about the true nature of health care
marketing (Hauser, 1985, p. 6).

Hospitals were at first

just appointing their community relations representative as
their marketing department, and taking a ''glorified public
relations" approach to marketing.

Often this marketing

person did not have the expertise to handle this new
position (Higgins, 1986b, p 1).

In 1979 only 4% of the

hospitals had a staff member with a title associated with
marketing.

By 1982 this increased to 36%, according to

Mackesy ( 1985).
Studies show that one way in which hospitals have tried
to get away from this "haphazard approach" to advertising
has been through the use of marketing research, most
typically in the form of community and patient surveys
(Jenson, 1985b; Rowland, 1985).
The American Hospital Association also had released a
guide in 1977 for advertising by hospitals, outlining the
purposes of hospital advertising as follows:
1. Public education about available services
2. Public education about health care (focusing on
preventative care)
3. Public accountability (accounting to the communities
for the ways community resources are being used)
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4. Maintenance or increase of market share
5. Public support (both for funds and political
assistance)
6. Employee recruitment
7. Medical staff support
To date, health care marketing has been predominantly
image oriented, focusing on "we care" advertisements and
strong public relations and community visiblity.

But in the

last few years, more and more hospitals are formulating
product-line management strategies.

According to one

survey, products that marketers have targeted as most
important to the consumer include (in order):

general

surgery, cardiac care, obstetrics and geriatric services
(Powills, 1985e, p. 61).
Still other hospitals are just restructuring their
image campaign techniques.

For example, in 1986, hospitals

in Tennessee, Illinois and California began using
celebrities to promote their hospital, a typical strategy
for other industries promoting image ("Health care
marketing," 1986).
It is the purpose of this study to contribute to the
larger question of whether product is superior to image
marketing for hospitals.

HYPOTHESES
Hl.

AMI Brookwood Community Hospital, after the
implementation of a marketing program, will show
considerable improvement in the areas of community
(a) awareness, (b) usage and (c) image of the hospital.

H2.

There will be more improvement or respondent recall in
attributes related to the products that were marketed
by Brookwood than in the image marketed during that
period.

H3.

Consequent to the specific development and marketing of
products relevant to women's interests, there will be
an improvement in women's (a) awareness, (b) usage and
(c) image of Brookwood.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.

Is there a difference in the opinions expressed by
long-term residents (10 years or longer) as opposed to
short-term residents (less than 10 years)?

2.

Is there a difference in the opinions expressed by
older respondents (35 and older) as opposed to younger
respondents (less than 35 years old)?
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METHODOLOGY
To achieve the goals of this study, a Central Florida
hospital, AMI Brookwood Community Hospital (hereafter
referred to as Brookwood), has been selected for analysis.
This hospital was chosen because it has closely followed the
most typical hospital patterns outlined by a consensus · of
previously mentioned writings, and should therefore have
widespread application.

Brookwood had to deal with a

negative public image and very little marketing organization
in the early stages (Copeland, 1982).
of image marketing.

This led to the use

Later, Brookwood strategically employed

product marketing as well.
To review, Brookwood was first opened under the name of
Mercy Hospital in 1965 by the Catholic Diocese of Orlando.
Like most community hospitals, it had the same problem that
Brown summarizes as being a "community" hospital that is not
aware of or responsive to the community (Brown, 1973).
Mercy Hospital never had a formal marketing department
or marketing plan.

As was the industry pattern, however, it

had one full-time community relations person.

The only

"marketing" that occurred 'from 1965 to 1983 was concerned
with image recognition in the community.

This was loosely

structured and was achieved more through civic service than
anything else.

There were few advertisements and no
29
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structured public relations campaigns.

Most importantly,

there was no "product" promotion whatsoever, according to
Brenda DeTreville, marketing director.
In 1978, Brookwood Health Services, Inc., purchased the
hospital and changed the name to Brookwood Corrununity
Hospital.

No changes occurred in the area of marketing,

with the exception of limited efforts to promote the
hospital name change.

Then, in 1981, American Medical

International (AMI), one of the largest health care services
companies in the country, purchased Brookwood.

AMI

immediately invested $4 million in updating the hospital's
medical equipment (DeTreville, 1985).

While there was some

effort to continue with "image" strategies, particularly the
promotion of the new affiliation, there was no promotion of
the improved "product," according to DeTreville.
In 1983 AMI took the first two steps toward a marketing
plan.

First, they conducted a Community Awareness and Image

Tracking Study (CAITS) for the primary and secondary service
areas surrounding the facility.

According to DeTreville,

the alarming results of the CAITS led them to their second
major move--hiring a director of marketing, whose expertise
was marketing, not medicine.
CAITS revealed that less than one out of five people
would consider using Brookwood for general hospitalization,
although it was the most conveniently located facility.
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Further, 22% volunteered that they would not want to go to
Brookwood at all.
Brookwood's position with respect to serious illness or
injury treatment was even worse.

Most expressed a

preference to travel the extra distance to either Florida
Hospital or Orlando Regional Medical Center.

The most

active rejection came from women who had lived in the area
for more than five years (CAITS, 1983).
The hospital's most salient characteristic relates to
the dimension which was least important to
consumers--convenience of location.

However, one out of

four respondents did not even know where the hospital was
located (CAITS, 1983).
The CAITS results concluded that Brookwood had an
extremely poor image that fell well below the AMI norm in
terms of favorable ratings and well above average with
respect to unfavorable ratings.

Moreover, it was viewed by

respondents as being substantially worse than its
competitors.
Finally, when questioned as to the ownership of the
hospital, only one person out of 300 responded correctly.
Most believed it to still be privately owned (CAITS, 1983)
This negative image can be linked to a variety of
causes.

Certainly it evinces the lack of marketing strategy

and the ineffectiveness of the image promotions that were
done.

32

The new marketing director decided to structure the
marketing plan in two directions.

First there was a

continued effort at "image" marketing, most importantly a
focus to identify this hospital with the larger corporate
chain.

Secondly, there was a product marketing strategy to

include such services as childbirth facilities, the
emergency room and outpatient services (DeTreville, 1986a).
These and other similar promotions have been in place
for three years.

It is the intent of this study to conduct

a post-test, replicating the original CAITS questions, in an
effort to keep the comparative measurements valid.

In

addition, the survey will add some specific questions
concerning products, such as childbirth facilities,
outpatient surgery and emergency room usage.
The following more clearly defines the categories of
Brookwood's image and product marketing activities over the
three year period between the pre-test and post-test.
First, in the area of image marketing is the strong
promotional effort to link Brookwood with their national
ownership, American Medical International, Inc. (AMI).

This

was done to expunge the negative image that had developed
over their early years as Mercy Hospital.

Brookwood and AMI

administrators believed that identification with their
national affiliate would improve their credibility and
overall image.
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Further, there was a continued problem of being
confused with Brookwood Recovery Center (or Brookwood
Lodges, as they had been originally named), a substance
abuse center that at one time was affiliated with Brookwood.
A large number of respondents seemed to confuse the two
organizations (CAITS, 1983).
To eliminate this confusion, "AMI" was added to
Brookwood's formal name.

All printed materials, such as

hospital stationery and brochures, as well as all
advertising, displayed this new name.
devised.

A new logo was also

One tactic used to announce this change was

billboards with the image slogan "AMI Brookwood--Changing
for the Better."
In addition, a direct mail campaign was implemented.
Direct mail had become very popular in the hospital
marketing industry and was believed to be one of the most
effective methods of hospital advertising, although there
has been no empirical data to support this (Powills, April
20, 1986c).
Five different collateral pieces were mailed out into
the primary and secondary service areas over a period of
about six months.

Three of these brochures had image

messages, two related more to product.
The first mailing introduced another image slogan,
"Quality Care, Personal Touch."

This phrase was also used
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on other pieces of collateral advertising and billboards
(DeTreville, 1986b).
A second mailing also focused on "quality care."

It

was a brochure with photographs and brief biographies of
staff members, primarily nurses.

Nurses were featured

because the 1983 CAITS had shown poorest attitudes towards
the nursing staff.
"This mailing was designed to show the community that
Brookwood's staff offered quality care (expressed through
cited credentials) and yet gave a personal touch by letting
the community meet the staff, many of whom they could
recognize as their own neighbors," said DeTreville.
A third image mailing revealed the future plans of
Brookwood and stressed its commitment to the community.
This was done to again stress the "we care" approach of
image advertising.

It also was designed to strengthen their

ratings in terms of community involvement, since Brookwood
had previously not rated very high (CAITS, 1983).
To further enhance community image, Brookwood became
involved in several community education programs.

Like many

health care marketers, Brookwood believed that educating the
community would lead to increased usage of the hospital
facilities (Gavin, 1975) .· While studies have shown similar
hospital education programs to be well-received, it has not
yet been proven to increase hospital usage (Cunningham,
1985/1986).
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Brookwood's most successful program, in terms of
earning marketing and community service awards, was the
"Snakes Alive" program, which identified different venomous
snakes and first aid measures for snake bites.

It was

promoted through a printed brochure, lectures, radio and
television appearances and advertisements.
Another safety program, called "Little No-Nos," was a
poison prevention program specifically directed toward
children.

This also incorporated lectures, a brochure and

media coverage.
Other safety programs included first-aid instruction,
infant car seat promotion and cardio-pulminary resuscitation
certification classes.

Brookwood also printed and

distributed an emergency medical guide and other educational
newsletters.

Producing educational newsletters has become

almost a standard marketing procedure in the hospital
industry, including the Central Florida area (Burns, 1986).
Brookwood established a speakers' bureau, making
available staff as experts for community organizations and
the media.

The hospital established regular "round table"

conferences with invited community leaders, media and
physicians.
Other community image promotions included hosting a
Florida Symphony concert on the property, and supporting
local Boy Scout chapters and charities.
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Brookwood improved the facility's appearance and
convenience for patients.

They increased the parking area

and moved it closer to the hospital.

They also improved

their signage on the street and made a double boulevard
entrance/exit, which created a better traffic flow.

They

also improved both the interior and exterior of the building
and the landscaping.
Internally, they used established public relations
techniques for improvement in staff attitude towards the
patients by improving overall communication (Beyer, 1986).
Areas of product marketing that occurred during this
period include a very strong promotion of their emergency
room facilities.

The 1983 CAITS showed that in an

emergency, most respondents would prefer to travel the extra
distance to either Florida Hospital or Orlando Regional
Medical Center, instead of using the more conveniently
located Brookwood.

Brookwood, meanwhile, had earned a level

three trauma rating, the highest an emergency room can have.
The promotion of their emergency room included a direct mail
campaign, newspaper, magazine, radio and billboard
advertising.

Billboard marketing has been proven very

effective in emergency room promotion for other markets
("Emergency care promoted," 1986).
There was an extensive public relations promotion and a
direct mailing concerning the purchase of upgraded
equipment, particularly a $5.5 million investment in
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equipment for clinical services, obstetrics, surgery and
radiology.
There was an expansion and promotion of ambulatory care
services, especially in outpatient surgery.

Management

implemented a physical therapy program, a sexual dysfunction
center and the Opti-fast center.

Opti-fast is a medically

supervised weight loss program, especially well-received by
women patients.
This study also examined Brookwood's marketing of
products or services targeted specifically to women.
Products of specific interest to women that were developed
and/or promoted during this period include an improved
birthing center service.

This encompassed the addition of

Lamaze classes, new obstetric equipment, upgraded facilities
and personal touches such as birth announcements.
were marketed as "packages" with package prices.

These
Promotion

was primarily through public relations efforts and print
materials distributed mainly in doctors' offices.
Brookwood also had a women's services program which
focused on linking awareness about preventative or self care
with the hospital's gynecological services.

For example, a

brochure on how to administer a breast self-examination,
which also covered related medical tests and services
offered by Brookwood.

This strategy has been suggested as

being an effective way to generate hospital usage (Fink,
197 2) •
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These were all part of Brookwood's image and product
marketing strategies over the three years and comprised the
independent variables for this study.
Subjects
Subjects were randomly selected residents within the
primary and secondary zip code service areas of AMI
Brookwood Community Hospital, as determined by admissions
records and previous demographic studies.
A zip code format was determined to be most appropriate
for targeting subjects in this type of study (Greene, 1981).
In order to test Hypothesis #3, and not to prejudice
overall results, subjects were evenly divided between males
and females.
Interviews were terminated if the subjects were
employed in the health care industry or had their health
care provided by the military.
Subjects were asked their age and length of residency,
to see if there was any correlation between these factors
and the attitudes expressed.

In the first CAITS study, the

longer a person had lived in the area, the more negative the
attitudes were concerning Brookwood.
Subjects' age were later divided into two categories
based on reported age:

35 and over, and under 35.

Fifty-

nine percent of the respondents fell in the first category
and 40% in the second (1% gave no answer).

As with the

previous study, length of residency was divided between 10
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years or less, and over 10 years.

Forty percent of the

respondents were Central Florida residents for 10 years or
less, 57% for 11 or more years (3% gave no answer).
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) participants and
other prepaid insurance plan holders were not eliminated.
This was due to other studies in the field revealing that
HMO subscribers have just as much awareness as non-HMO
subscribers about health care services in their communities
(Stier, 1986).
A total of 702 phone calls were completed, 368 of which
were determined to be qualified as respondents.

The other

334 were eliminated because of the above mentioned factors
or not wishing to participate in the study.

Those phone

numbers with no answer were tried twice and then discarded
if still no answer (they were not included in the 702
figure).

Eighteen of the 368 respondents were eliminated

once interviewing was underway because they asked to
discontinue the study.
Design
Independent Variables
The independent variable for Hypothesis #1 was the
change of strategy in the marketing program at Brookwood,
specifically, a structured program that included emphasis on
product marketing.
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There are two independent variables for Hypothesis
#2,image marketing and product marketing by Brookwood.
Image and product marketing are operationally distinguished
as follows:

"Image" marketing refers to any advertisement,

public relations or promotional effort concerning the
institution of Brookwood or AMI, as opposed to its specific
services or products (Schudson, 1984).

The detailed

accounting of which has already been outlined.
The independent variable for Hypothesis #3 was those
products or services targeted specifically to women.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable for both hypotheses #1 and #2 is
attitudinal change.

The dependent variable for Hypothesis

#3 is attitude change among women only.
To aid in the measurement of attitudinal change,
questions were designed to incorporate three different areas
in which change may have occurred--awareness, usage and
image (Grass, Bartges & Piech, 1972).
Hospital awareness questions included asking
respondents to name hospitals in their area to see how many
knew about Brookwood.

They were also asked the location of

the hospital and its ownership.

ownership was particularly

important in determining if that image campaign was a
success.

A question was added to this study to determine if

Brookwood AMI was still confused with the recovery center.
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Advertising and news awareness questions were also
asked.

Respondents were asked if they could recall seeing

any advertisements or news stories about Brookwood.
Futhermore, respondents were asked if the news stories had
been favorable, neutral or unfavorable in content.
Usage questions included the respondent or immediate
family member's usage of Brookwood in the last two years, as
well as projected usage of Brookwood in the future.

These

areas are further broken divided into categories for
overnight stay, serious illness, emergency room treatment
and outpatient services.

This has been done to determine

whether specific product promotions, namely emergency room
and outpatient facilities, produced significant improvement.
Some future usage questions that were not in the
original CAITS were also added.

These included some

products that Brookwood specifically promoted, and some that
were not, in order to see if those that were marketed were
better received.
Image questions focused on the respondent's opinions of
both specific images and products of Brookwood.
included the hospital's:

Image items

(a) putting the patients' well

being first; (b) excellent medical staff; (c) excellent
hospital overall; and (d) involvement in the community.
Product items were the hospital's:

(a) up-to-date

equipment, (b) excellent emergency room, and (c) convenient
location.
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Apparatus
A post-test survey, with some minor additions from the
original conducted in 1983, was administered.
Procedure
The survey was administered via the telephone at
various times during the day.

The callers did not identify

themselves as being interested in or affiliated with one
particular hospital, so as to not prejudice answers received
(Burns, 1985/1986).
Some questions were unaided (open-ended, with no
specific hospitals mentioned), particularly the introductory
ones, so as to not affect recall.

Later questions were

aided, with the questions being specifically directed at
Brookwood and its six major competitors.

RESULTS
Hypothesis #1
Hypothesis #1 was not supported.

Post-test results

show no overall improvement in the public's attitude towards
Brookwood.
Awareness
Awareness of the hospital was changed slightly.

The

prior number of respondents who recalled Brookwood as a
hospital in their area was already 79%.

It dropped by 1% in

the post-test.
Respondents' awareness of Brookwood's location
decreased from 65% to 58%.

However, an increase of 5% over

the first study realized it was the nearest hospital to
their home, for a total of 36% of the respondents.
One-third of the respondents could recall seeing
advertising for Brookwood, up 3% from 1983.

News item

recall, however, only increased by 1%, for a total of 14%.
An interesting finding, however, is that the majority of
these respondents remembered the news as being favorable in
nature, when in fact

th~

most recent news story had stated

that Brookwood had the highest room and service rates in the
area.

This gave evidence of the Sleeper Effect, where, over

time, the content of articles read shifted to being recalled
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as being positive, whether they were actually positive or
not (Wimmer & Dominick, 1983).
The area of awareness that showed the most improvement
was the recognition of the proper hospital name and its
affiliation with AMI.

Those who knew the ownership was a

corporation was up 17%, for a total of 36%.

Those who

correctly named AMI specifically jumped from only 1% to 11%.
Usage
In terms of hospital usage, Brookwood showed a
decrease.

Those who said they or their family had used

Brookwood during the past two years for general service had
dropped from 17 to 15%.

Those who reported using Brookwood

for an overnight stay dropped from 15 to 10%.
room usage dropped from 17 to 10%.

Emergency

Only outpatient services

showed any improvement, but this was only 1%.
When responding about future usage, the hospital again
showed decreased results.
dropped from 12 to 10%.
to 7%.

Projected general service use
Serious illness use dropped from 11

Emergency room use dropped from 19 to 10%.

It is interesting to note, however, that the number of
people actively rejecting Brookwood decreased.
would reject it for
to 14%.

g~neral

Those that

hospitalization dropped from 15

Those rejecting it for serious illness usage
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dropped 6% to a total of 14%.

And those rejecting the

emergency room service dropped from 13 to 11%.
Image
For those questions in which respondents were asked
to rank a hospital on a variety of image attributes,
Brookwood showed some minor improvement.

Those who rated

Brookwood high on "putting the patients' well-being first"
increased 7% to a total of 27%.

Those who felt Brookwood

had an "excellent medical staff" rose 3% to 19%.

The number

saying Brookwood was an "excellent hospital overall" rose 8%
to 21%.

The "excellent nurse" ranking was up 8% to 24%.

The rankings for "up-to-date equipment" and "community
involvement" remained unchanged.

Those feeling that

Brookwood had "nice rooms" went up 6% to 18%.

Brookwood's

ranking of "convenient location" was still the highest of
all rankings, even though it dropped 1% to 36%.
Hypothesis #2
Hypothesis #2 was not supported.
Product
The largest product promotion was for the emergency
room facility.

The past two years' usage of this facility

was down 7%, to only 10% usage by survey respondents.
Projected usage also dropped from 19 to 10%.

Those actively
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rejecting the emergency room, however, had decreased from 13
to 11%.
Contradicting this, however, is the rise in the highimage ranking of the emergency room from 16 to 26%.
Outpatient services was the only area of hospital usage
that increased, but it was only by 1%.
Respondents in the 1986 study were also asked which
hospital they would recommend for five different services:
outpatient surgery, childbirth, women's health services,
cardiac and orthopedic.

The first three of these were

promoted by Brookwood, the other two were not.

While all

ratings were low, the first three were ranked slightly
higher than the two not promoted.

Outpatient surgery was at

6%, childbirth was at 3%, women's services at 4%, the other
two were 2%.
Image
The effort to link recognition of Brookwood with its
national affiliate appears to be an area that is improving
for the hospital.

Those people who perceived ownership of

the hospital jumped 17% to 36%.

Eleven percent of these

knew specifically the link with AMI, with only 1% naming AMI
in 1983.

No one identified it as Mercy Hospital, unlike the

1983 study.
One question was added in this study that was not in
the 1983 study.

Brookwood, until late 1985, had been
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affiliated with Brookwood Lodges (or Brookwood Recovery
Center as it was later called).

Brookwood Lodges, a

substance abuse recovery center, was managed as a totally
separate facility and was not even located near the hospital
property.

Brookwood Lodges was heavily advertised and

because of this, people were confusing the two.

Brookwood

received many daily inquiries that had to be redirected to
the recovery center.

When asked if they thought Brookwood

was affiliated with a drug rehabilitation center 22%
responded yes.
All other areas of image also showed slight
improvement.

The image of Brookwood "putting the patients'

well being first" increased from 20 to 27%.

"Having an

excellent medical staff" was up only 3%; however, "having
excellent nurses" was up 8%.

The quality of nurses was

specifically promoted in one of the direct mailings.

Rating

it as an "excellent hospital overall" increased from 13 to
21%.

Having "nice rooms" was also up 6% to 18%.

Being

considered "very active in the community" was the only
rating that remained unchanged.
The difference in the pre-test, post-test findings for
product and image shows image ratings increasing more than
product ratings.
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Hypothesis #3
Hypothesis #3 was not supported.
Awareness
General hospital awareness was down for women from 88%
in 1983 to 81% in 1986.

Location awareness was also down,

dropping by 17% to 58%.
An area where awareness increased was in advertising
and news recall.

One-third of the women surveyed recalled

seeing an advertisement for Brookwood, this is up 4% from
1983.

News recall jumped 9% to 21%.
ownership awareness also increased for women

respondents.

One-third of the women knew Brookwood's

ownership, with 13% specifically identifying AMI.

This is

up from 18% awareness and zero identification with AMI.
Usage
Hospital usage was up slightly for overnight stay, from
11 to 14%.
from 8% to

Outpatient services also showed a minor increase
10%~

General service and emergency room usage

were down 1% and 5% respectively.
Projected usage, however, was down in all areas.
General hospitalization use dropped 1% to 10%, serious
illness was down 2% to only 8%.
to 9%.

Emergency room went from 16
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The number of women rejecting Brookwood decreased.
Those rejecting Brookwood for general hospitalization went
from 18 to 15%, serious illness from 24 to 17% and emergency
room from 14 to 13%.
The five projected usage categories concerning specific
hospital programs did not overall rank very high.

Using

outpatient surgery and women's health services received the
highest rankings at 5%.

Only 4% would go to Brookwood to

have a child, 3% for cardiac care and 2% for orthopedics.
Image
There was some improvement in general image, as women
did rank the hospital's image higher.

Belief that Brookwood

"puts the patients' well being first" was up 5% to 29%.
"Excellent hospital" only increased 1%.

"Excellent

emergency room" ranking doubled going from 15 to 30%.
"Excellent medical staff" ranking dropped 5% to 16%, while
"excellent nurses" increased to 27% from a former 18%.
"Community involvement" increased 3% to 23%.

"Nice rooms"

went up 10% to 23%.
Research Question #1
Residents of 10 years or more had greater awareness of
Brookwood in all areas than did those residents of less than
10 years.

Residents of 10 years also ranked Brookwood

higher in image characteristics.

But, surprisingly, it was

the residents of under 10 years who claimed more usage, and
projected more future usage than did longer-term residents.

so
Awareness
Long-term residents were consistently higher in their
awareness of Brookwood than were short-term residents.
overall awareness of Brookwood was improved for short-term
residents, going from 62 to 74%.

Long-term residents showed

a slight decrease, going from 85 to 81%.

Location awareness

went from 42 to 48% for short-term residents, but dropped
from 74 to 66% for long-term residents.
improved in advertising and news recall.

Both groups
Short-term

residents more than doubled ad recall, going from 13 to 29%.
Long-term residents showed only slight change, going from 35
to 36%.

News item awareness jumped from eight to 16% for

short-term residents, and from 13 to 22% for long-term
residents.

Awareness of ownership nearly tripled for short-

term residents, going from 11 to 31%, with half of them
specifically identifying AMI.

Long-term residents also

showed improvement on this item, going from 21 to 40%, with
15% identifying AMI.
Usage
Twice the number (14%) of short-term residents reported
having used Brookwood for an overnight stay.

Eighteen

percent of the short-term residents reported using Brookwood
for general services--this was 5% higher than long-term
residents.

Four percent more used the emergency room (total

of 12%), and 3% more used the outpatient services (total of
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15%).

Short-term residents' use of outpatient services went

from 5% in 1983 to 15% in 1986, whereas long-term residents
showed no change in the 12% response from 1983 to 1986.
In terms of future usage, all three areas of
care--general hospitalization, serious illness and emergency
room--found short-term residents more likely to use the
service than long-term residents.

The rejection rate by

long-term residents was higher in two of the three
categories than for the short-term residents.

Fifteen

percent of the long-term residents rejected Brookwood for
general hospitalization, compared to 12% of short- term
residents.

Sixteen percent of the long-term residents

rejected it for serious illness, compared to 12% of shortterm residents.

The short-term residents showed a 2%

decrease in rejection rate (12% to 10%) for the emergency
room.
It is interesting to note, however, that long-term
residents' rejection levels for all three areas have
improved over the last three years, while short-term
residents rated two of the three (general hospitalization
and emergency room) services worse than in 1983.
Short-term residents rated all five specific services
higher than did long-term residents.

Seven percent of

short-term residents would recommend Brookwood for
outpatient care, compared to 6% of long-term residents.
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Childbirth facilities would be recorrunended by 5% of shortterm residents and 2% of long-term residents.

Attitudes

towards women's services revealed the largest divergence
between the short- and long-term residents:
2 9-,0 .

6% compared to

For cardiac care, 3% to 2%; and for orthopedics, 3%

compared to 1%.
Image
In terms of image characteristics, both short- and
long-term residents seemed generally to improve from the
1983 rankings, although long-term residents' rankings were
higher in all but one category.

Brookwood's "putting the

patients' well-being first" rated 28% with short-term and
26% with long-term residents.

Brookwood's "excellent

medical staff" rated 15% by short-term and 21% by long-term
residents.

Having an "excellent hospital overall" ranked

17% with short-term and 24% with long-term residents.

In

the area of "up-to-date equipment," short-term residents
went from zero in 1983 to 8% percent in 1986, while longterm residents dropped from 15 to 14%.

"Excellent emergency

room" more than doubled in rating for both short- and longterm residents--short-term residents went from 7% to 16%,
while long term residents went from 15 to 32%.

"Corrununity

involvement" remained almost unchanged for both groups,
although long-term residents still scored it higher at 21%
compared to 17%.

"Having nice rooms" dropped

53
considerably by short-term residents, from 21 to 12%, while
more than doubling for long-term residents from 11 to 23%.
Research Question #2
In the areas of awareness, usage and image, respondents
aged 35 and over gave higher ratings than did respondents
under 35.
Awareness
People 35 and over were slightly more familiar with
Brookwood, rating 81% compared to 74% in general awareness.
Older respondents were also more familiar with Brookwood's
location, 62% compared to 52%.

Younger respondents were

slightly more aware of advertising (35 compared to 32),
although recall fewer news items (15 compared to 23).

Older

respondents were considerably more aware of Brookwood's
ownership.

Forty-one percent of older respondents knew

ownership, with 18% having named AMI specifically.

This

compared to 28% of younger respondents, with 11%
indentifying AMI.

Both groups had nearly doubled in their

ownership awareness.
Usage
In general, usage was down for both groups from 1983,
except for a 1% increase in use of outpatient services.
hospital usage over the past two years, there was no

For
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meaningful difference reported between the groups except
for overnight stays, in which the older group doubled in
usage (from 6% to 12%).
Projected use for general hospitalization declined for
younger respondents, dropping from 15% in 1983 to 8% in
1986.

The older respondents, meanwhile, rose from 10 to

12%.

When asked whether Brookwood would be considered for ·

serious illness, the younger group reported decreased
interest, dropping by one-half to an 8% projected usage.
The older group dropped only 1%, from 8% to 7%.

Emergency

room projected use dropped more than half for the group
under 35, going from 24 to 11%.

The older group dropped

from 15 to 10%.
Rejection levels showed slight improvement for both
groups.

Rejection for general services was still 15% for

the younger group, while the older group dropped from 16 to
14%.

Rejection for serious illness dropped considerably for

the younger group--from 24 to 15%, while the older group
also dropped from 17 to 14%.

Emergency room rejection

improved by 5% for the younger group, going from 17 to 12,
and remained at 10% for the older group.
In the ratings for the five specific services, the
older group scored them · higher than the younger group.

Six

percent of the younger group would consider using
Brookwood's outpatient services, as would 7% of the older
group.

The group under 35 gave a zero rating for the
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childbirth facilities at Brookwood, while the 35-and-over
group rating totaled 6%.

Women's services rated 3% with the

younger group and 5% with the older.

Cardiac care and

orthopedic care each rated only 1% from the younger group,
and 3% and 2% respectively for the older group.

The older

group did rate the three promoted services higher than the
two not promoted.
Image
Older respondents consistently ranked the image
categories higher than did the younger group.

The older

group's responses also showed more improvement in these
areas from the 1983 study than did the younger.

Five of the

eight attributes decreased for the younger group.
Brookwood's "putting the patients' well-being first"
dropped 3% to 17% for the younger group, while the older
group jumped 10% to 31%.

Having an "excellent medical

staff" dropped from 19 to 12% for the younger group and
increased from 13 to 23% for the older group.

"Excellent

emergency room service" did increase for both groups, going
from 10 to 18% for the younger group, and from 21 to 32% for
the older group.

"Up-to-date equipment" dropped more than

half for the younger group to 7%, while it increased 3% to
13% for the older group.

"Excellent nurses" increased by 1%

for the younger group to 14%, and jumped from 19 to 30% for
the older group.

Brookwood's rating as an "excellent
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hospital overall" dropped by 2% with the younger group to
12%, and increased from 12 to 27%
Having "nice rooms"

for the older group.

increased for both groups, going from

9% to 14% for the younger group and from 15% to 22% for the
older group.

Brookwood's being viewed as "community active"

dropped for the younger group from 23% to 18%, and increased
from 16% to 20% with the older group.
Summary of Findings
Hypothesis #1
Hypothesis #1 was not supported.

There was no

improvement in the areas of awareness, usage or image.
There was, in fact, a decrease in usage.
Hypothesis #2
Hypothesis #2 was not supported.

There was no greater

awareness or recall of products over image.

In fact, image

ratings were higher than product ratings.
Hypothesis #3
Hypothesis #3 was not supported.
in the areas of awareness and usage.

There was no increase
There was some

increase in image ratings.
Research Question #1
Long-term residents were found to have a higher
awareness and more favorable image of Brookwood than
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shorter-term residents.

Surprisingly, it was the shorter-

term residents who claimed more past usage and projected
more future usage of the hospital.

Short-term residents

were also less likely to reject Brookwood.
The short-term group showed more improvement over the
three-year period in awareness in all categories.

Both

groups improved in news item recall and ownership
identification.
Usage and projected usage generally decreased for the
long-term residents, and only improved in a few areas, such
as outpatient services, for the short-term residents.
Image ratings had improved for both groups, although
long-term residents' ratings were higher in all but one
category.
Research Question #2
Those respondents aged 35 and over were found to be
more aware of, and to have a better image of, Brookwood
Hospital than did the group under 35.

They also reported

past usage and plans for future usage more frequently.
In terms of improvement over the three-year period,
both groups showed more awareness of Brookwood's ownership.
The older group also improved in news item recall, while the
younger group showed less improvement.

The older group also

showed improved in all areas of image ratings, while the
younger group only showed improvement in three areas, two
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of which (emergency room and nursing staff) had been heavily
promoted.

DISCUSSION
~ypothesis

#1

This study found that the implementation of a
structured marketing program at Brookwood has not yielded
improvement in overall community awareness, usage or image
of the hospital.
Because the area of hospital marketing is so new, and
therefore the study of it even newer, it is difficult to
ascertain the best ways to test new theories.

Comparing

surveyed attitudes and reported usage in a pre-marketing and
post-marketing condition would seem an effective method.
The problems that arise in such conditions, however, must be
considered.

The main problem is the effect of time on

certain variables, which may diminish the effectiveness of
the design.
One such unpredictable variable could be the impact of
hospital competitors• marketing campaigns on the same group
being studied.

This is particularly true in this case, as

Brookwood is in an increasingly competitive environment.
And since Brookwood is substantially smaller than its two
main competitors, Orlando Regional Medical Center and
Florida Hospital, its marketing budget, as well as its
staff, is only a fraction of its competitors'.
a~vertising

With

costs' being so high, it is reported that one59
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half of most hospitals' marketing budgets are absorbed by
their advertising (Steiber & Jackson, 1985).

Therefore, the

effectiveness of Brookwood's marketing program may have been
overshadowed by the effectiveness of its competitors'
campaigns, simply because those hospitals had more dollars
to spend and more manpower available to execute them.
Another factor that gives Brookwood's competitors a
possible edge is that Brookwood has gone through an identity
crisis over the past 10 years, changing ownership and name
twice.

The former Mercy Hospital had developed such a

negative reputation that in this case a less negative rating
might carry just as much significance as another hospital's
more positive one.
In addition, because half the population of the
community studied have been Central Florida residents for
over 10 years, there isn't the advantage of a constantly
changing market that would be unbiased and more receptive to
a marketing campaign.
Another reason a study of this type could be
ineffective is that physicians or particular insurance plans
may be determining for the patient which hospital they
should use.

In this study, when asked why they selected a

hospital for their most . recent stay, 59% said the decision
had to do with their physicians' recommendation, but only 7%
said it had to do with their health coverage.
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Thirty percent of the respondents said they selected their
hospital based on prior experience with that hospital.
Another potential problem for a study of this type
would occur if the hospital was not offering the quality of
service it was promoting.

This possiblity was examined in

this study by comparing the answers of those respondents who
have used Brookwood in the last two years to those who have
not.

The results show that in all questions relating to

future hospital usage, people who have used Brookwood before
gave it much higher ratings than those with no recent
Brookwood experience.

A single positive usage experience

has proven to be a significant factor in future hospital
selection, according to Costello (1985).

This would lead to

the conclusion that Brookwood does have the product, but is
having difficulty marketing it.
A final possiblity may be that the questionnaire itself
was ineffective in measuring what it was designed to
measure.

The image questions, however, were based on a

previous study by AMI in 1981, asking patients to rank
those attributes of a hospital that they considered most .
important when selecting one for service.

In addition,

there were considerable changes in certain areas of the
tests for other hospitals, particularly Orlando Regional
Medical Center.
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Hypothesis #2
The effectiveness of product over image marketing was
not established.

This is due, in part, to the fact that

Hypothesis #1 was not supported.
If anything, image traits on the whole had improved for
the hospital.

Attitudes towards both the nursing staff and

the emergency room showed improvement.

Both these programs

were heavily promoted, the former as an image
latter as a product.

and the

But this improvement in attitude did

not correspond with an increase in usage or projected usage
of the hospital's facilities.
Further results would indicate that image promotion was
effective in terms of hospital name awareness and ownership
identification, as well as location and community
involvement, but again this did not affect usage.
When those respondents that had used Brookwood over the
last two years were asked why they selected it, the number
one reason was location, followed closely by physician's
recommendation.

Also listed were the recommendation of a

friend or the respondent's prior usage of Brookwood.

Not

one respondent cited any of the image-related
characteristics, such as quality of care, or equipment, as a
reason.

This finding was similar for respondents who had

used any hospital in the last few years.

Fifty-nine percent

consulted with their physician in the decision, followed by
30% who had used the hospital before.

The next most
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frequently cited factor was location, and then came quality
of staff, friend's recommendation and quality of equipment.
It may be that both Brookwood and other Central Florida
hospitals have been using more image than product
advertising and, therefore, their marketing plans have not
had a major impact in changing consumers' decision making
process.
Hypothesis #3
Hypothesis #3 was not supported, and also relates to
the first two hypotheses not being supported either.

Women

in the previous study were found to be very negative toward
Brookwood.

The active rejection rate of Brookwood by women

has improved; however, the usage rate has decreased.
Females in this study followed the same trends overall
as the general population, and therefore previous
explanations for hypothesis rejection would also apply here.
There be a further correlationship between women having a
negative attitude toward using Brookwood and the overall
population having a negative attitude toward using the
hospital.

Other studies' findings have led some researchers

to believe that women have a stronger influence on hospital
selection than do men in the household (Bluestone, 1978).
One additional possiblity as to why there was .no
improvement in women's ratings is that much of the
promotional literature concerning the childbirth facilities
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and women's health services was distributed through
physicians' offices.

When questioned as to why they chose a

particular hospital, however, 60% of the women had consulted
with a physician, so it is hard to determine, what if any
impact this had.
Research Question #1
This research question, relating to long-term versus
short-term residents' ratings, lends more credence to the
theory that improved hospital awareness and image may not
necessarily correlate with increased usage.

A similar

finding was reported (as previously mentioned in this study)
by a private research firm hired by the American Medical
Association.

That study led the researcher to infer that

although hospital advertising improved awareness, it did not
increase usage, especially in the case of image advertising
("New 'realities' challenge," 1986).
Not surprisingly, the longer-term residents had a
higher awareness of Brookwood than did the short-term
residents.

The longer-term residents, who in the past had

been more negative about Brookwood in terms of image, were
now more positive than the shorter-term residents.
Conversely, the short-term residents claimed more hospital
usage and projected more future usage than long-term
residents.
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Brookwood administrators had determined that it would
be more difficult to change the opinions of the long-term
residents.

Apparently it is easier to change or improve

opinions, but more difficult to improve usage.
Research Question #2
Respondents 35 and over were found to have higher
awareness, higher usage and more positive image of the
hospital than respondents 34 and under.
One explanation may be that older respondents would
tend to use hospitals more over all (Ostroff, 1985).
However, in looking at those who had used a hospital during
the last two years, there was only a 9% higher usage rate by
the older group.
This study would also tend to disagree with a previous
study showing that 75% of consumers aged 35 and older, left
hospital decision-making exclusively to their physicians
(Jensen, 1985a).
It would appear then that Brookwood's campaign has been
more effective for those 35 and over.

CONCLUSION

When examining the scope of this study, it should be
noted that no known research has been conducted previously
in the specific area of product marketing versus image
marketing in the health care industry.
While the hypotheses were not supported, this study has
added a foundation for research in health care marketing.
This study indicated that marketing for hospitals, unlike
almost all other industries or products, did not have an
effect on end usage.

Was this due to a flaw of a particular

hospital's campaign strategy or in the study's design?

Or

could this actually be what is being experienced in the
early days of health care marketing?

According to the one

report, stating that hospital marketing, particularly image
marketing, did not increase hospital usage, this might be a
very real possibility ("New 'realities' challenge", 1986).
Or, if this is true, could it just be that once again
the health care professionals are out-of-touch with the
general public?

While the doctors and hospitals decided

that they preferred image marketing and would therefore
implement that strategy, no one determined what the consumer
wanted (Cebrzynski, 1985).

The consumers of today have

shown that they are no longer easily manipulated into
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domination by the medical industry in other areas, would it
not be logical to assume that this would carry over into
marketing as well?

The hospitals have never really

understood what the consumer wanted in the past, and perhaps
it is going to take time to realize that these strategies
are not what they appear to want now (Bean, 1985).
Knowing which direction to take will not be easy for
health care marketers, as they are trying to communicate for
an industry that has undergone major structural changes in a
relatively short period of time.

The economic climate and

consumer profile would lead to the conclusion that these
changes will become even more dramatic in the years ahead.
Health care, therefore, is a very difficult product to know
how to package or promote (King, 1985).
Consumers, on the other hand, are not used to
"shopping" for medical services, and it may be that it is
going to take time for them to grasp this concept (Andrus &
Kohout, 1984/1985).

Consumers. have shown a strong interest

in being educated about health care, particularly
preventative medicine (Flexner, McLaughlin & Littlefield,
1977).

As the public's level of knowledge increases in this

area, their buying habits would probably become more
sophisticated, as indicated by gradually declining role of
physicians in patients' hospital selection.

One study

actually suggests that when consumers were not well
informed, or became confused by too much information, they
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were more likely to allow their physician to make the choice
for them (Powills, 1986b).
Brookwood's attempt to establish itself as the one most
frequented by its community might have been achieved if they
had given more focus to promoting specific programs and
products that the consumer might purchase, instead of trying
to establish itself as a "good neighbor" (Bonnen & Falberg,
1977).

For example, activities like hosting a Florida

Symphony Orchestra concert may make the community more aware
of Brookwood or rate it higher on civic involvement, but it
is probably having and promoting quality medical services
that will bring patients to the door (Clarke, 1978).
It may also be that this study, or certain aspects of
it should be replicated in a controlled, instead of actual,
environment.

Using the real population, instead of a

controlled study group, seemed to be the right direction
when trying to determine not only hospital awareness and
image, but actual usage.

This was further reinforced by

previous findings showing that the most effective method of
assessing hospital consumers was through telephone surveys
in specified zip code areas (Keckley, 1985).

However,

testing the marketing effort in the field and not the
laboratory created some 'influences that could not be
predicted or controlled, and that, too, may have affected
the resulting data.
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A similar study repeated in a laboratory environment
would allow screening for such outside variables as
competitors' campaigns or hospitals' size differences.

The

researcher could use fictitious hospitals, whose only
differences would be in marketing strategy whether
product- or image-oriented.

All other factors would be

neutralized.
One problem with controlled environment studies,
however, is that many of them must rely on the usage of
college students as subjects, due to limited funds or the
the time demands of the subjects.

But this study showed

that only 1% of the 18-24 year old bracket had used any
hospital service in the last two years, and would therefore,
not be representative subjects.
Perhaps the best option would be to replicate this
study with other hospitals in other marketing areas, this
would also tend to neutralize some outside variables and
peculiarities of specific hospitals.
Health care marketing is a new area which needs
additional research and replication in order to offer a
basis for comparison with these results.
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TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE PRE-TEST/POST-TEST RESULTS
FOR ALL 350 RESPONDENTS

AWARENESS

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Total Awareness

79

78

-1

Location Awareness

65

58

-7

Advertising Recall

30

33

+3

News Recall

13

14

+1

(Favor./Nuet./Unfav.)
Ownership
AMI

(10/2/1) (12/5/3)
19

36

+17

1

11

+10

Drug rehabilitation
BROOKWOOD USAGE

22
1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Overnight

15

10

-5

Any Service

17

15

-2

Emergency Room

17

10

-7

Outpatient

13

14

+1

General

12

10

-2

Serious Illness

11

7

-4

Emergency Room

19

10

-9

Last two years:

Projected usage:

71

TABLE 1 -- CONTINUED

BROOKWOOD USAGE

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Projected for Specific Service:
Outpatient Surgery

6

Deliver baby

3

Women's services

4

Cardiac

2

Orthopedic

2

Reject usage:
General

15

14

-1

Serious Illness

20

14

-6

Emergency Room

13

11

-2

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Patients' Well Being First

20

27

+7

Excellent Medical Staff

16

19

+3

Excellent Hospital

13

21

+8

Up-to-date Equipment

12

12

0

Excellent Emergency Room

16

26

+10

Excellent Nurses

16

24

+8

Community Active

19

19

0

Attractive/Comfortable Rooms

12

18

+6

IMAGE
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TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE PRE-TEST/POST-TEST RESULTS
FOR 175 FEMALE RESPONDENTS

AWARENESS

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Total Awareness

88

81

-7

Location Awareness

75

58

-17

Advertising Recall

29

33

+4

News Recall

12

21

+9

(Favor./Nuet./Unfav.)
Ownership
AMI

(10/0/1) (12/6/4)
18

33

+15

0

13

+13

Drug rehabilitation

21
1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Overnight

11

14

+3

Any Service

16

15

-1

Emergency Room

16

11

-5

8

10

+2

General

11

10

-1

Serious Illness

10

8

-2

Emergency Room

16

9

-7

BROOKWOOD USAGE
Last two years:

Outpatient
Projected usage:

73

TABLE 2 -- CONTINUED

BROOKWOOD USAGE

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Projected for Specific Service:
Outpatient Surgery

5

Deliver baby

4

Women's services

5

Cardiac

3

Orthopedic

2

Reject usage:
General

18

15

-3

Serious Illness

24

17

-7

Emergency Room

14

13

-1

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Patients' Well Being First

24

29

+5

Excellent Medical Staff

21

16

-5

Excellent Hospital

18

19

+l

Up-to-date Equipment

17

16

-1

Excellent Emergency Room

15

30

+15

Excellent Nurses

18

27

+9

Community Active

20

23

+3

Attractive/Comfortable Rooms

13

23

+10

IMAGE
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TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE PRE-TEST/POST-TEST RESULTS
DIVIDED BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCY

YEARS
LESS THAN 10
AWARENESS

10 AND GREATER

1983

1986

1983

1986

Total Awareness

62

74

85

81

Location Awareness

42

48

74

66

Advertising Recall

13

29

35

36

8

16

13

22

11

31

21

40

0

15

1

15

News Recall
Ownership
AMI

51

Drug rehabilitation

47
1986

1983

1986

1983

Overnight

19

14

11

7

Any Service

14

18

17

13

Emergency Room

13

12

17

8

5

15

12

12

General

11

12

11

9

Serious Illness

10

10

10

5

Emergency Room

15

13

18

9

BROOKWOOD USAGE
Last two years:

Outpatient
Projected usage:
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TABLE 3 -- CONTINUED

BROOKWOOD USAGE

1983

1986

1983

1986

Projected for
Specific Service:
Outpatient Surgery

7

6

Deliver baby

5

2

Women's services

6

2

Cardiac

3

2

Orthopedic

3

1

Reject usage:
General
Serious Illness
Emergency Room
IMAGE

7

12

19

15

15

12

22

16

9

12

14

10

1983

1986

1983

1986

Patients' Well Being

21

28

21

26

Excellent Med. Staff

9

15

18

21

11

17

14

24

Up-to-date Equipment

0

8

15

14

Excellent Erner. Room

7

16

15

32

Excellent Nurses

28

22

12

26

Community Active

18

17

20

21

Attractive/Comf. Rooms

21

12

11

23

Excellent Hospital
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TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE PRE-TEST/POST-TEST RESULTS
DIVIDED BY RESPONDENT AGE

AGE
LESS THAN 35
AWARENESS

35 AND GREATER

1983

1986

1983

1986

Total Awareness

78

74

79

81

Location Awareness

66

52

65

62

Advertising Recall

26

35

32

32

News Recall

13

15

12

23

ownership

15

28

22

41

1

11

0

18

AMI
Drug rehabilitation
BROOKWOOD USAGE

49

49
1983

1986

1983

1986

Last two years:
Overnight

14

6

16

12

Any Service

16

14

18

15

Emergency Room

14

10

20

9

Outpatient

13

14

13

14

General

15

8

10

12

Serious Illness

16

8

8

7

Emergency Room

24

11

15

10

Projected usage:
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TABLE 4 -- CONTINUED

BROOKWOOD USAGE

1983

1986

1983

1986

Projected for
Specific Service:
Outpatient Surgery

6

7

Deliver baby

0

6

Women's services

3

5

Cardiac

1

3

Orthopedic

1

2

Reject usage:
General

15

15

16

14

Serious Illness

24

15

17

14

Emergency Room

17

12

10

10

1983

1986

1983

1986

Patients' Well Being

20

17

21

31

Excellent Med. Staff

19

12

13

23

Excellent Hospital

14

12

12

27

Up-to-date Equipment

15

7

10

13

Excellent Erner. Room

10

18

21

32

Excellent Nurses

13

14

19

30

Community Active

23

18

16

20

9

14

15

22

IMAGE

Attractive/Comf. Rooms

78

TABLE 5

MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR PRE-TEST/POST-TEST RESULTS

AWARENESS

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Total Awareness

.7866

.7771

.0095

Location Awareness

.6533

.5771

.0762

Advertising Recall

.2966

.3314

.0348

News Item Recall

.1266

.2000

.0734

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Overnight

.1456

.1027

.0429

Any service

.1233

.1057

.0176

Emergency room

. ·0 833

.0457

.0376

Outpatient

.0466

.0600

.0134

General

.1200

.1000

.0200

Serious Illness

.1733

.0742

.0991

Emergency Room

.1733

.1028

.0705

General

.1533

.1400

.0133

Serious Illness

.2066

.0742

.1324

Emergency Room

.1266

.1057

.0209

USAGE
Last two years:

Projected usage:

Reject usage:
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TABLE 5 -- CONTINUED

1983

1986

DIFFERENCE

Patients' Well Being

.1271

.1761

.0490

Excellent Med. Staff

.1059

.1193

.0134

Excellent Hospital

.0847

.1363

.0516

Up-to-date Equipment

.0720

.0681

.0039

Excellent Erner. Room

.1016

.1590

.0574

Excellent Nurses

.1016

.1534

.0518

Community Active

.1228

.1079

.0149

Nice Rooms

.0762

.1136

.0374

IMAGE

APPENDIX A

la.

Hello, I'm
from Interviewing Service of
America. We're conducting a survey on health care.
Today, we are calling people in your area and I would
like to include your opinions.

lb.

Is your or your family's health and hospital care
provided by the military? (If yes, terminate
interview)

le.

Are you or anyone in your family employed by a
hospital? (If yes, terminate interview)

ld.

Confirm interviewee's zip code.
terminate interview)

2.

I'd like to ask you some questions about hospitals.
When you think of hospitals in your general area, which
ones come to mind?

3a.

If you required hospitalization, which hospitals in
your general area would you consider going to?

3b.

Which hospitals, if any, would you not want to go to?

4a.

If you needed to be hospitalized for a very serious or
complicated illness, which hospitals in your general
area would you consider going to?

4b.

Which hospitals, if any, would you not want to go to
for a very serious or complicated illness?

Sa.

If you required emergency treatment which hospital
emergency rooms or other health care facilities would
you consider going to?

Sb.

Which hospital emergency rooms or other health care
facilities, if any, would you not want to go to for
emergency treatment?

6a.

Have you or a close family member been a patient for at
least one night in a hospital in your general area in
the past two years?

6b.

At which hospitals?
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(If incorrect,
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7a.

Have you or a close family member used a hospital
emergency room in your general area in the past two
years?

7b.

At which hospitals?

7c.

·why did you or your family member select this hospital?

8a.

Have you or a close family member used any outpatient
services offered at a hospital or other health care
facility in the past two years? This would include
surgery, x-rays, lab tests, physical therapy or other
services not connected with an emergency room visit or
overnight stay.

8b.

At which hospitals or other health care facilities?

(Questions 9 - 15e required the use of a chart that listed
seven hospitals: AMI Brookwood Community Hospital, Florida
Hospital, Humana Hospital Lucerne, Orlando Regional Medical
Center, Sand Lake Hospital, West Orange Memorial Hospital,
and Winter Park Memorial Hospital.)
9.

Have you ever heard of ('x' hospital)?

10.

Have you seen or heard any advertising for ('x'
hospital) in the past few months?

lla. Have you seen or heard anything in the news media about
( 'x' hospital) in the past few months?
llb. overall, would you say that what you heard about ('x'
hospital) in the news media was it generally favorable,
unfavorable, or neutral?
12.

Do you know where ('x' hospital) is located?
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13.

I'd like to get your opinions of some hospitals in your
general area. Even though you may never have been to
some of the hospitals, please give me your opinions
based on anything you may have heard about each
hospital. I'll mention some characteristics that can
describe a hospital and for each one I'd like you to
tell me how much you agree or disagree that it
describes each of the hospitals. Let's use the numbers
from one to 10. The more you agree that the
characteristic describes the hospital, the higher the
number you should give it, and the more you disagree,
the lower the number you should give it.
Has an excellent emergency room ........ .
Has the most up-to-date equipment ...... .
Has attractive and comfortable rooms ... .
Puts the patients' well-being first .... .
Has an excellent nursing staff ......... .
Is an excellent hospital overall ....... .
Is involved in community activities .... .
Has an excellent medical staff .•........

14.

I'd like to know who you believe owns some of the
hospitals in your general area. Let's start with
As far as you know, who owns this
hospital? (This question is to be unaided with answers
recorded in the appropriate categories)

15a. Which one hospital in your area would you be most
likely to go to or recommend going to for treatment of
broken bones/orthopedics?
15b. For the delivery of a baby?
15c. For outpatient surgery?
15d. For women's health care services?
lSe. For cardiac care?
16a. How many years have you lived in this general area?
16b. What is your age?
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